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Crossing 138: Two Approaches to 
Churn under the Affordable 
Care Act 
Gabriel Ravel & J. Angelo DeSantis† 
Abstract 
A predicted side effect of the Medicaid expansion and state-based 
Exchanges under the Affordable Care Act is churn. Churn is the shifting 
into and out of eligibility for insurance affordability programs due to 
income changes. Because the line between Medicaid and Exchange 
eligibility is fine –138% of the federal poverty level –millions of Ameri-
cans are expected to gain and lose eligibility. Frequently, this churning 
undermines continuity of care, raises costs, and frustrates those affected. 
This article explores two proposed programs to mitigate the effects of 
churn: the Basic Health Program and the Bridge Program. This article 
evaluates both programs’ ability to mitigate the effects of churn, the 
likely side effects to states’ implementing them, and legal and practical 
obstacles to their implementation. It concludes that the Bridge Program 
is the better approach.  
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Introduction 
A. The Churn Problem  
The Affordable Care Act follows a circuitous path to cover most 
Americans. Rather than creating a streamlined single payer system, the 
Act employs an array of public and public–private programs to expand 
coverage: Medicare for the elderly; Medicaid for the poor; and for most 
others, either employer-sponsored coverage or Exchange-bought cover-
age. This intricate system inevitably creates problems. One such problem 
stems from how eligibility is determined. 
For many insurance affordability programs,1 eligibility turns on an 
individual or family’s income, measured as a percentage of the federal 
poverty level (FPL).2 In Medicaid expansion states,3 individuals and 
families are Medicaid-eligible if their income does not exceed 138% FPL.4 
Above that level, those earning up to 400% FPL are eligible, on a sliding 
scale, for subsidized Exchange coverage.5  
But income as a percentage of FPL is a volatile factor; income shifts 
are common. This leads to “churning,” the frequent shifting into and 
 
1. The insurance affordability programs are “Medicaid, the Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (CHIP), or premium and cost-sharing assistance for 
purchasing private health insurance through state insurance Exchanges.” 
ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR INSURANCE 
AFFORDABILITY PROGRAMS 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/program_results_reports
/2013/rwjf404380. 
2. See id. at 2-4. 
3. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012) 
(holding that Congress may offer States grants to expand Medicaid 
eligibility, but “states must have a genuine choice whether to accept the 
offer”). As of this writing, twenty-six states will expand Medicaid 
eligibility. Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, 
HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2014), http://kff.org/medicaid/state-
indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-
care-act/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2014). 
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(7)(B)(i) (2012). 
5. See 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2012). 
Health Matrix·Volume 24·2014  
Crossing 138: Two Approaches to Churn under the ACA 
111 
out-of coverage eligibility.6 Under the Act, churning is expected between 
Medicaid eligibility and Exchange subsidy eligibility because of the many 
factors that affect income as a percentage of FPL.7  
For example, Ben earned $15,500 a year in 2012, when the poverty 
line for an individual was $11,170. Ben was ineligible for Medicaid 
because his income exceeds 138% FPL, or $15,414.60 (138% of $11,170).8 
But the next year, with the same income, Ben is Medicaid eligible 
because the poverty line for 2013 grew to $11,490, placing Ben’s income 
just above the 138% threshold of $15,856.20.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Benjamin D. Sommers & Sara Rosenbaum, Issues in Health Reform: How 
Changes in Eligibility May Move Millions Back and Forth Between 
Medicaid and Insurance Exchanges, 30 HEALTH AFFS. 228, 228 (2011). 
7. See id. at 228-29; COVERED CAL., BRIDGE PLAN: A STRATEGY TO PROMOTE 
CONTINUITY OF CARE & AFFORDABILITY THROUGH CONTRACTS WITH MEDI-
CAL MANAGED CARE PLANS 2 (2013) [hereinafter COVERED CAL.], available 
at 
http://www.healthexchange.ca.gov/BoardMeetings/Documents/February2
6_2013/VI._BRB_Bridge_Plan_(Update).pdf. 
8. State Exchanges are directed to use 2013 Federal Poverty figures to 
calculate eligibility for 2014. BERNADETTE FERNANDEZ, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R41137, HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUM CREDITS IN THE PATIENT 
PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (ACA) 4 n. 20 (2014), available 
at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41137.pdf. 
9. Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 77 Fed. Reg. 4034, 4035 
(Jan. 26, 2012).  
2012 Poverty Guidelines for the
48 Contiguous States and the District of Columbia9 
Persons in family/household Poverty guideline 
1 $11,170 
2 $15,130 
3 $19,090 
4 $23,050 
5 $27,010 
6 $30,970 
7 $34,930 
8 $38,890 
For families/households with more than 8 persons, add $3,960 for 
each additional person. 
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But if Ben marries Linh who also earns $15,500, neither Ben nor 
Linh will be Medicaid eligible in 2013 because the poverty line for a 
family of two is $15,510, placing the Medicaid eligibility threshold at 
$21,403.80 — well below Ben and Linh’s combined income of $31,000. 
But if Linh gives birth to twins, Kyle and Kevin, all four family 
members will be eligible for Medicaid because Linh and Ben’s combined 
income of $31,000 is less than the Medicaid threshold for a family of 
four: $32,499 (138% of $23,550). Moreover, while Linh is pregnant, she 
may be Medicaid eligible as most states cover pregnant women with 
income up to or above 185% FPL.11  
Those dizzying back-and-forths occurred without Ben’s income 
changing by a dime. But realistically, Ben and Linh’s income will 
fluctuate. Their work hours may be cut;12 they could lose or change jobs; 
they might take unpaid leave to care for Kyle and Kevin; or they could 
divorce (changing the size of the family, and thus the threshold FPL).  
And if Linh and Ben’s income passes 138% FPL, their children may 
be covered by CHIP while Linh and Ben are covered by Exchange plans. 
The same family could be covered by different insurance plans with 
different provider networks.13 
 
10. Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 78 Fed. Reg. 5182, 5183 
(Jan. 24, 2013).  
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(l)(2)(A)(i) (2012). 
12. See Lisa Myers & Carroll Ann Mears, Businesses Claim Obamacare Has 
Forced Them to Cut Employee Hours, NBC NEWS (Aug. 13, 2013, 6:17 
PM), http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/08/13/20010062-
businesses-claim-obamacare-has-forced-them-to-cut-employee-hours. 
13. See TENN. INS. EXCH. PLANNING INITIATIVE, BRIDGE OPTION: ONE FAMILY, 
ONE CARD ACROSS TIME (2011), available at 
http://www.tn.gov/nationalhealthreform/forms/onefamily.pdf. 
2013 Poverty Guidelines for the 48 Contiguous States and the 
District of Columbia10 
Persons in family/household Poverty guideline 
1 $11,490 
2 $15,510 
3 $19,530 
4 $23,550 
5 $27,570 
6 $31,590 
7 $35,610 
8 $39,630 
For families/households with more than 8 persons, add $4,020 for 
each additional person. 
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The many variables affecting eligibility multiplied by the 21.3 mil-
lion Americans expected to enroll in Medicaid by 2022,14 along with the 
existing 66 million enrollees,15 make frequent churning inevitable.16 
Indeed, 35% of adults with income below 200% FPL will experience an 
income change affecting their Medicaid eligibility within six months; 
50% will experience a change within a year.17 Further, 24% will churn at 
least twice within a year; 39% will churn twice in two years; and in all, 
38% will churn at least four times in as many years.18  
Churning creates many problems. Switching between Medicaid and 
Exchange coverage undermines continuity of care when it forces enrollees 
to change provider networks. And improving continuity of care is a 
major objective of the Affordable Care Act.19 But churn works against 
that goal. When patients switch providers, records transfer and may be 
lost.20 Providers must familiarize themselves with a new patient. Things 
 
14. KAISER FAM. FOUND., THE COST AND COVERAGE IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
ACA MEDICAID EXPANSION: NATIONAL AND STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS 1 
(2012), available at 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8384_es.pdf. 
15. See MACPAC, MACSTATS: MEDICAID AND CHIP PROGRAM STATISTICS 40 
(2013), available at http://www.macpac.gov/macstats (indicating that 
enrollment data is for 2010 and includes 9.7 million dual-eligibles). 
16. See Sommers & Rosenbaum, supra note 6, at 230. 
17. MD. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE: MEDICAID OFFICE OF 
PLANNING & THE HILLTOP INST., ANALYSIS OF THE BASIC HEALTH PROGRAM 
1, 9 (2009) [hereinafter MDHMH & HILLTOP INST.], available at 
http://dhmh.maryland.gov/docs/BHP%2001%2018%2012%20Report%20A
nalysis%20FINAL.pdf. 
18. Id. See also MIRANDA DIETZ ET AL., U.C. BERKELEY CTR. FOR LABOR RES. 
& EDUC., THE ONGOING IMPORTANCE OF ENROLLMENT: CHURN IN COVERED 
CALIFORNIA AND MEDI-CAL 2 (2014), available at 
http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/healthcare/churn_enrollment.pdf (noting 
that 16.5% of California Medi-Cal enrollees are expected to earn out of 
Medicaid within twelve months); Benjamin D. Sommers et al., Medicaid 
and Marketplace Eligibility Changes Will Occur Often in All States; Policy 
Options Can Ease Impact, 33 HEALTH AFFS. 700, 704 (2014). 
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 18051(c)(4) (2012) (“A State shall seek to coordinate the 
administration of, and provision of benefits under, its program under this 
section . . . to improve the continuity of care.”); § 1315b (c)(6) (“The goals 
of the Federal Coordinated Health Care Office are as follows: . . . (6) 
Improving care continuity and ensuring safe and effective care transitions 
for dual eligible individuals . . . .”); § 1395w-5 (a)(2)(C) (directing the 
secretary to develop a public reporting program for consumers that will, 
among other measures, report on “an assessment of the continuity and 
coordination of care and care transitions, including episodes of care and 
risk-adjusted resource use”).  
20. See R.A. Clay, The Advantages of Electronic Health Records:  Electronic 
Records Can Improve Patient Care. Here’s How, MONITOR ON PSYCHOL. 
(2012), http://www.apa.org/monitor/2012/05/electronic-records.aspx 
(“With electronic health records, the transfer of complete records from 
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may be overlooked; symptoms communicated to one provider may not 
be communicated to the next.21  
Further, not all patients dutifully reenroll every time their eligibility 
changes. A patient earning out of Medicaid may let coverage lapse before 
enrolling in an Exchange plan. And though she may risk an individual 
mandate penalty, the penalty is only triggered when the individual is 
owed a tax refund –not the case for all individuals close to 138% FPL. 
And if different members of the same household are enrolled in different 
networks and plans due to different eligibility statuses, it further 
increases the likelihood that one will not be reenrolled when eligibility 
changes.  
B. Two Approaches to Churn Consequences 
This article evaluates two approaches to mitigate the consequences 
of churn under the Affordable Care Act.22 The first is the Basic Health 
Program. Authorized by the Act, it offers states an alternative means for 
covering citizens earning between 138% and 200% FPL.23 Under Basic 
Health, states can provide similar coverage to Medicaid for enrollees 
earning above 138% FPL but below 200% FPL. Enrollees would incur 
some premium contributions and cost sharing.24 Basic Health would 
mitigate many harmful effects of churn at 138%, though churn would 
occur at 200% FPL. Still, shifting churn to a population better able to 
weather coverage changes may be an improvement.  
The other approach is the Bridge Program. Under the Bridge Pro-
gram, Medicaid-managed care issuers would offer “Bridge plans”: 
Medicaid plans on the Exchange. These plans would let Medicaid 
enrollees passing 138% FPL purchase identical coverage, benefits, and 
 
provider to provider or facility to facility happens electronically. That also 
means records don’t get lost or delayed when patients change providers or 
providers make referrals.”). 
21. See Sommers & Rosenbaum, supra note 6, at 234-35. 
22. At least one other solution has been proposed. Sara Rosenbaum and 
Benjamin D. Sommers suggested as a mitigation measure “a subsidy 
structure utilizing annual enrollment periods.” Sara Rosenbaum & 
Benjamin D. Sommers, Rethinking Medicaid in the New Normal, 5 ST. 
LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 127, 146 (2011). Subsidy and Medicaid 
eligibility would be determined for a plan year. “Individuals would sign up 
for coverage, say, on November 1, their incomes as of November 1 would 
have been compared to the subsidy scale as of that date, and the subside 
would have been locked in for the next twelve months.” Using an annual 
enrollment process and a twelve-month projected income approach, the law 
could have offered far more stability in enrollment. Id. 
23. 42 U.S.C. § 18051 (2012); DEBORAH BACHRACH ET AL., THE ROLE OF THE 
BASIC HEALTH PROGRAM IN THE COVERAGE CONTINUUM: OPPORTUNITIES, 
RISKS, AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR STATES 4 (2012), available at 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8283.pdf. 
24. BACHRACH ET AL., supra note 23, at 5. 
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provider network access at a highly subsidized rate. Access to Bridge 
plans may not be perpetual. At the states’ discretion, enrollees may 
eventually earn or time-out of eligibility, but when they do, they could 
simply buy comparable coverage on the Exchange.  
This article evaluates both programs’ ability to mitigate the churn 
consequences, the likely side effects to states’ implementing them, and 
legal and practical obstacles to implementation. We conclude the Bridge 
Program is the better approach. Although both programs place some 
Affordable Care Act values in tension with others, the Bridge Program 
provides multiple benefits over the Basic Health Program for enrollees 
and states. 
I. The Basic Health Program 
A. An Overview of the Basic Health Program 
1. Washington State’s Basic Health Program 
The Affordable Care Act’s Basic Health Program is modeled after 
Washington State’s Basic Health Program.25 In the mid-1980s, Washing-
ton State explored ways of expanding coverage to residents.26 A major 
barrier to that expansion was the growing cost of care. Managed care 
offered a solution.27 But implementing that solution involved many false 
starts. 
In 1983 the legislature created a committee to study the problem of 
uncompensated charity care, estimated to cost $60 million a year. The 
committee saw expanding coverage as the solution and proposed expand-
ing Medicaid eligibility, made affordable, by adopting a managed care 
system. The committee also recommended a statewide charity pool, 
funded by state hospital contributions. The legislature ultimately 
rejected legislation implementing the committee’s plan, following 
hospital opposition.28  
Washington’s governor then ordered a study of options for control-
ling state-purchased health care costs.29 The study recommended a six-
year plan to increase managed care.30 A second study (ordered by the 
legislature) examined means of encouraging the use of managed care. 
 
25. Press Release, Office of Sen. Maria Cantwell, Cantwell Announces Federal 
Basic Health Plan Timeline (Apr. 18, 2013), available at 
http://www.cantwell.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-
releases?ID=381378e5-d2d4-4be2-8827-82a14cf6852f. 
26. Carolyn W. Madden et al., Washington State’s Basic Health Plan: Choices 
and Challenges, 13 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y. 81, 82 (1992). 
27. Id.  
28. Id.  
29. Id. at 82-83.  
30. Id. at 83. 
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That study’s final report focused on using managed care to increase 
access to low-income residents, rather than to simply reduce costs. It 
concluded that expanding managed care could increase Medicaid 
eligibility.31 
These twin studies led to two bills (one in 1985, one in 1986) to im-
plement what was called a “Basic Health Plan.”32 The plans would 
increase access to care while controlling expenditures. They would cover 
non-elderly uninsured with income below 200% FPL. Coverage would be 
basic but comprehensive, with an emphasis on prevention. Coverage 
would be through a managed care system under contract with the 
state.33 
Both bills failed. Legislators disagreed about the magnitude of funds 
required and the appropriate funding source. The 1985 bill would have 
taxed hospitals and physicians, angering providers. The 1986 bill would 
have imposed a “sin tax,” largely on cigarettes, angering groups wanting 
cigarette tax revenue to go elsewhere. Legislators also worried that Basic 
Health would become a fiscal “black hole.” Indeed, no one knew how 
many eligible residents there were, how many would enroll, or whether 
employers would drop coverage in favor of Basic Health. For answers, 
the legislature created a new commission.34 
The McPhaden Commission formed in 1986.35 Composed of legisla-
tors from both parties, care providers, businesses, and constituent 
groups, it was tasked with fleshing out the details of a workable Basic 
Health Plan.36 The Commission surveyed statewide to determine the 
number of Basic Health eligible persons in Washington and their 
characteristics. The Commission “generated actuarial estimates of 
various program designs . . . [and] . . . considered the governance and 
administration of the program.”37  
The result was that Basic Health Plan legislation passed in 1987.38 
Basic Health would cover individuals under 65 with income below 200 
percent FPL. Enrollees would make premium and co-payments on a 
sliding scale.39  
 
31. Id.  
32. Id.  
33. Id.  
34. Id.  
35. Id. at 83-84.  
36. Id. at 84. 
37. Id. 
38. Id.  
39. Id. at 85, 89. 
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The Basic Health Plan was temporary, limited to a five-year demon-
stration.40 That limit created implementation problems, as providers 
were leery of investing in a program that might be short-lived.41 The 
plan also limited enrollees. Only 30,000 residents from at least five 
congressional districts could enroll in the demonstration.42 This further 
dampened provider enthusiasm.43  
Although the plan covered the poor, it did not use Medicaid funds, 
in part because Basic Health covered some swaths of the population not 
eligible for Medicaid.44 But there was also a desire to avoid the stigma of 
Medicaid welfare funding.45 Care under Basic Health was provided by 
managed care systems under contract with the State. The care was basic 
but comprehensive: it emphasized preventive benefits but included 
hospital, physician, ER, and ambulance services.46 But it “did not cover 
prescription drugs [or] mental health, vision, or dental care and included 
a 12-month waiting period” for coverage of pre-existing conditions.47  
Basic Health signed its first service contract in late 1988.48 The next 
year, Basic Health expanded to two more counties and capacity was 
added to existing counties.49 By 1991 fifteen managed care providers 
enrolled 20,700 residents in fourteen counties.50 In 1993 the legislature 
made Basic Health permanent, and enrollees doubled in 1994.51 That 
year prescription drug benefits were also added.52 Soon after, Basic 
Health Plus was created to cover women and children who churned into 
and out of Medicaid eligibility.53 The result was, from the perspective of 
enrollees, seamless coverage: “To the member, it’s all Basic Health.”54 
 
40. Id. at 85. 
41. Id. at 86. 
42. Id. at 85. 
43. Id. at 86.  
44. Id.  
45. Id.  
46. Id. at 83, 85.  
47. STATE OF WASH. HEALTH CARE AUTH., A STUDY OF WASHINGTON STATE 
BASIC HEALTH PROGRAM 4 (2002) [hereinafter WASH. HEALTH CARE 
AUTH.]. 
48. Madden et al., supra note 26, at 91. 
49. See WASH. HEALTH CARE AUTH., supra note 47, at 3. 
50. Madden et al., supra note 26, at 91. 
51. See WASH. HEALTH CARE AUTH., supra note 47, at 3. 
52. Id. at 4.  
53. Id. at 2. 
54. Id. 
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A little over twenty years after Basic Health took effect, Washington 
Senator Maria Cantwell included an amendment to the Affordable Care 
Act bill to give states the option of following Washington State’s lead.55 
2. The Basic Health Program under the Affordable Care Act 
Section 1331 of the Affordable Care Act establishes a “Basic Health 
Program” for states to provide “standard health plans.”56 The plans are 
in lieu of Exchange plans for individuals and families earning between 
138% and 200% FPL.57 Plans offered under the Basic Health Program 
must provide, at a minimum, essential health benefits.58 Premiums may 
not exceed what an eligible individual would pay for the benchmark plan 
–the second-lowest cost silver plan –in their rating area.59 And cost-
sharing may not exceed that of a platinum plan (90%) but only for 
individuals with a household income of 150% FPL or lower. For individ-
uals above 150% FPL, cost sharing may not exceed that of a gold plan 
(80%).60  
While the Basic Health Program has been called a “quasi-public op-
tion” or “single-payer lite,” it does not involve a public health insurer; 
Basic Health is implemented through contracts with private insurers.61 
 
55. See JANET VARON, NW. HEALTH LAW ADVOCATES & NHELP CONTRACT 
ATT’Y, THE BASIC HEALTH OPTION: CONSIDERATIONS FOR STATES 
IMPLEMENTING FEDERAL HEALTH REFORM 1-2 (2010), available at 
http://www.familiesusa.org/conference/health-action-2011/speaker-
materials/NHELP-Paper-Basic-Health-Option.pdf. 
56. 42 U.S.C. § 18051(a)(1) (2012). 
57. § 18051(e)(1)(B). 
58. § 18051(e)(1)(A). 
59. § 18051(a)(2)(A)(i). Marketplace insurance plans are divided into five 
categories based on premium and out-of-pockets costs: “bronze,” “silver,” 
“platinum,” “gold,” and “catastrophic.” See also How Do I Choose 
Marketplace Insurance?, HEALTHCARE.GOV, 
https://www.healthcare.gov/how-do-i-choose-marketplace-insurance (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2014). 
60. § 18051(a)(2)(ii) (2012). 
61. See BACHRACH ET AL., supra note 23, at 8; Ryan Grim, Senate Committee 
Passes Quasi-Public Option, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec 1, 2009, 5:12 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/10/01/senate-committee-passes-
q_n_306831.html. Cf. Igor Volsky, Media Mischaracterizes Cantwell’s 
Basic Health Plan Amendment as “Quasi Public Option,” CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS (Oct. 2, 2009), 
http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2009/10/02/62618/cantwell-not-public-
plan/ (“Under Cantwell’s proposal, states would use their purchasing 
power to negotiate for more affordable coverage options, improve 
efficiencies, and even lower the health care costs within the Exchange (by 
shifting lower income and disproportionately sicker individuals into the 
Basic Health Plan), but they would have to contract with private insurers. 
Cantwell herself ‘declined to liken her proposal to a controversial public 
option, which has become a major sticking point in health care reform.’ ‘I 
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Under Basic Health, states may select plans from HMOs, licensed health 
insurers, and networks of care providers established to offer services 
under the program.62 In negotiating contracts, states are to consider 
“innovation” including: 1) care coordination and care management 
(especially for enrollees with chronic health conditions); 2) incentives for 
using preventative services; and 3) provider-patient relationships that 
maximize patient involvement in care decision-making, including 
providing incentives for appropriate use of care.63 In turn, providers 
should use managed care or as many attributes of managed care as 
possible.64  
To fund Basic Health, the federal government will pay states 95% of 
what the enrollee would have received under the Exchange in premium 
tax credits and cost-sharing reductions. But the Act limits states’ use of 
those funds to enrollee premium and cost-sharing reductions or providing 
enrollees additional benefits.65  
Individuals are eligible for Basic Health Plans if: (1) they are not 
enrolled in Medicaid; (2) they earn between 133% and 200% FPL; (3) 
they are not eligible for minimum essential coverage from an employer-
sponsored plan; and (4) they are under 65.66 Eligible individuals may not 
purchase coverage from the Exchange.67 Thus, no effort is needed to 
encourage eligible consumers to choose Basic Health Plans over Ex-
change plans.68 Also, lawful permanent resident aliens who earn below 
138% FPL and who have lived in the U.S. for less than five years are 
eligible for a Basic Health Plan, though they are ineligible for Medicaid.69  
But the Affordable Care Act provides only a broad sketch of Basic 
Health. Regulations implementing the specifics are needed. And as of 
this writing, such regulations exist only in draft form and do not fully 
 
think we’ve hit the sweet spot’ (sic) she said. ‘Everybody says they want to 
have private providers (sic) and we’re saying fine.’”). 
62. Id.; BACHRACH ET AL., supra note 23, at 4. 
63. BACHRACH ET AL., supra note 23, at 4. 
64. Id. (explaining that states may also negotiate regional compacts with other 
states and may agree to have the same issuers provide standard health 
plans to eligible residents in all compact states). 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Something not true of the Bridge plan. See infra Part II. 
69. ALISON SISKIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 41714, TREATMENT OF 
NONCITIZENS UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE 
ACT 30 (2011), available at 
http://www.nafsa.org/uploadedFiles/CRS%20analysis%20re%20noncitizens
.pdf (explaining that lawful permanent resident aliens are eligible for the 
Exchange at the highest level of subsidies, whether or not there is a Bridge 
or Basic Health Program). 
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answer many questions regarding a state’s implementation of Basic 
Health.70 
3. How the Basic Health Plan May Mitigate the Effects of Churn  
Unlike the Bridge Program, Basic Health was not created to reduce 
the effects of churn. Yet, it may be used for that purpose. States might 
mitigate churn effects by offering Basic Health Plans with coverage 
similar to Medicaid –”Medicaid-look-alike” plans.71 Eligible individuals 
passing 138% FPL could enroll in plans similar to their Medicaid 
coverage.72  
Offering comparable coverage will reduce churn consequences by al-
lowing individuals who transfer out of Medicaid to keep their provider 
network and benefits until they reach 200% FPL.73 And enrollees need 
not contend with premium sharing and subsidies under the Exchange. 
There would be no requirement to estimate income for the following year 
under the threat of an end-of-year reconciliation.  
Depending on the plans’ cost, enrollees may be responsible for a por-
tion of the premiums and cost-sharing. But states may not require 
enrollees to pay more in premiums than they would for the silver plan 
they would otherwise have been eligible for. And cost sharing may not 
exceed that of a platinum plan (90% actuarial value) for individuals 
earning up to 150% or a gold plan (80% actuarial value) for all others.74  
Basic Health may be characterized as simply kicking the problem 
down the road by shifting the Exchange threshold to 200% FPL. But 
churn may be less prevalent at 200% FPL. One study found that churn 
is likely to decrease at 200%.75 The study followed individuals ages 19 to 
62, with income below 400% FPL and without employer-sponsored 
 
70. Basic Health Program: State Administration of Basic Health Programs; 
Eligibility and Enrollment in Standard Health Plans; Essential Health 
Benefits in Standard Health Plans; Performance Standards for Basic 
Health Programs; Premium and Cost Sharing for Basic Health Programs; 
Federal Funding Process; Trust Fund and Financial Integrity, 78 Fed. Reg. 
59,122 (Sept. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 600 & 45 C.F.R. pt. 
144). 
71. 78 Fed. Reg. at 59,138. 
72. Ann Hwang et al., Creation Of State Basic Health Programs Would Lead 
To 4 Percent Fewer People Churning between Medicaid And Exchanges, 31 
HEALTH AFFAIRS 1314, 1318-19 (2012) (indicating that “if states designed 
Basic Health Programs that were not compatible with Medicaid in terms of 
benefits and providers, they would simply be adding another layer of 
churning at both 138% and 200% of the federal poverty level”). 
73. BACHRACH ET AL., supra note 23, at 6. 
74. The proposed rules provide that cost sharing must be reduced even further: 
94% actuarial value for those up to 150% FPL and 87% for those up to 
200% FPL. 78 Fed. Reg. at 59,133. 
75. Hwang et al., supra note 72, at 1317. 
Health Matrix·Volume 24·2014  
Crossing 138: Two Approaches to Churn under the ACA 
121 
insurance. After twenty-four months, 39.5% of the population experi-
enced two eligibility changes at the 138% level. At the 200% level, 36.1% 
experienced two eligibility changes. Population members experiencing 
one change were 17.3% and 15.8% respectively.76  
And beyond raw numbers, the study authors noted that at 200% 
FPL, individuals are more able to weather brief coverage gaps, provider 
changes, and cost sharing changes.77 Shifting Exchange eligibility up 
would also protect lower income individuals from potential tax credit 
recoupment. 
4. Practical Issues with the Basic Health Program 
The complexity of some states’ Medicaid systems complicates 
providing Medicaid-comparable coverage. For example, California’s 
Medi-Cal system is county-focused and divided between two delivery 
systems: fee-for-service and managed care. 78 The managed care system 
has three models, each offering a different type of managed care.79 And 
sixteen not-for-profit health plans and four commercial for-profit plans 
provide Medi-Cal managed care services to approximately 4.5 million 
members.80 Among managed care plans, there remain carve-outs where 
 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. CAL. DEP’T OF HEALTHCARE SERVS., MEDI-CAL MANAGED CARE PROGRAM: 
BASELINE QUALITY REPORT 3 (Apr. 2012), available at 
http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/dataandstats/reports/Documents/MMCD_Qual_
Rpts/Studies_Quality_Strategy/QualityReport_April2012.pdf. See also 
HEALTH RESEARCH FOR ACTION, UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY, THE MEDI-CAL 
MANAGED CARE PROJECT: INCREASING AWARENESS ABOUT MEDI-CAL 
MANAGED CARE AND PROMOTING VOLUNTARY ENROLLMENT FOR SENIORS 
AND PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 1, available at 
http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/provgovpart/Documents/MMCDExpansion/Outre
ach%20_Education_Project_Overview.pdf. 
79. The three are County Organized Health Systems (COHS), the two-plan 
model, and geographic managed care. CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., MEDI-
CAL FACTS & FIGURES: A PROGRAM TRANSFORMS 27 (2013), available at 
http://www.chcf.org/~/media/MEDIA%20LIBRARY%20Files/PDF/M/P
DF%20MediCalFactsAndFigures2013.pdf. In COHS counties, all 
beneficiaries share the same managed health care plan. Id. The two-plan 
model supports two different health plans in the county: a “Local 
Initiative,” where the community gives input in the development of the 
plan, and a “Commercial Plan,” a private health plan that provides 
benefits to Medi-Cal enrollees. Id. The state contracts with both plans in 
counties with this model. Id. The third managed health care model is 
geographic managed care. Under that model, the State contracts with 
multiple commercial plans to provide benefits. Id. 
80. Id. 
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the state assumes responsibility for certain care on a fee-for-service 
basis.81 
Still, California is unifying and simplifying its Medicaid system to 
coincide with Medicaid expansion. By 2014 managed care will be 
available in every county, and most members will be mandatorily 
enrolled into a managed care plan.82 But 1 to 1.5 million Californians are 
expected to continue to receive Medi-Cal services through a fee-for-
service system.83 
Simplifying Medicaid systems and moving away from fee-for-service 
in particular, makes providing comparable coverage more feasible. 
Patients receiving fee-for-service care will not find identical coverage 
under a managed care Basic Health Plan. In those instances, it is 
possible — but unlikely — that a Basic Health Plan may include the 
same provider network.  
B. Potential Downsides of the Basic Health Program 
1. Only Partial Federal Government Funding 
The Basic Health Program is not without risk to the state. One sig-
nificant challenge is funding. While Basic Health might give consumers 
more affordable coverage, it could leave states — already in a tenuous 
financial position — with substantial financial liabilities.  
The Affordable Care Act leaves states to cover the administrative 
costs of the program.84 It prohibits states from using Basic Health funds 
for administrative costs.85 Government funding (the 95% of what an 
individual would have received in premium tax credits and cost sharing 
on the Exchange) covers only the cost of coverage.86  
And administrative costs in implementing and operating Basic 
Health may be substantial. Indeed, federal Medicare administrative 
 
81. Id. at 26. See also Sara Rosenbaum & David Rousseau, Medicaid at Thirty-
Five, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 7, 45 (2001) (“As states have begun to purchase 
managed care products, it is clear that virtually no vendors sell products as 
broad as Medicaid coverages either requires or permit. States have pursued 
a logical tactic of effectively breaking up their state plans into two 
components: one consisting of the managed care contract and the other 
consisting of residual benefits that remain directly administered by the 
state. The result has been a hodgepodge of state managed care agreements 
that vary enormously in what lies ‘inside’ the agreement and what lies 
‘outside’ the scope of the contract and, thus remains a direct responsibility 
of the state agency.”). 
82. E-mail from Anthony Cava, Spokesman, Cal. Dep’t of Health Care Servs. 
to Angelo DeSantis (Aug. 9, 2013) (on file with author). 
83. Id. 
84. 42 U.S.C. § 18051 (2012). See also BACHRACH ET AL., supra note 23, at 17. 
85. § 18051(d)(2). 
86. § 18051 (d)(3)(A)(i); MDHMH & HILLTOP INST., supra note 17, at 4. 
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expenses total $2 billion a year.87 Even if the Basic Health Program is 
housed in an existing state agency, creating a new program always 
incurs administrative expenses. These include: assessing the quality of 
care, managing a trust fund for federal payments, collecting and distrib-
uting enrollee premiums, and liaising with the federal government.88  
Collecting and distributing premiums in particular can be an expen-
sive undertaking for states. Because the plans are not likely to be fully 
funded by the federal government, states will collect premium contribu-
tions from enrollees, combine that with federal subsidies, and pay the 
issuers.89 This fund collection and channeling is not required for either 
Medicaid programs or Exchange plans. Thus, this new duty would 
require increasing personnel or contracting out to third parties.90 
And this is not the only potential cost arising out of Basic Health. 
The federal government’s 95% contribution may guarantee a low or zero 
premium for Basic Health enrollees, but it may not cover all an enrol-
lee’s claims during the plan year. If the premiums and federal 
contributions fail to cover claims, states are liable for the shortfall.91 
Moreover, the lack of final federal regulations for Basic Heath creates 
financial uncertainty for states. How the federal government will recon-
cile under- and over-payments of state subsidies is unknown.92 Also 
unknown is how precisely federal payments will be calculated.93 The 
federal government could alleviate some of the financially difficult 
aspects of Basic Health through regulations, although the proposed rules 
do not elaborate on this topic.94 Indeed, the Act’s language that federal 
contributions can “only be used to reduce the premiums and cost-sharing 
of, or to provide additional benefits” suggests that regulations alone 
cannot lift the state’s administrative burden.95  
 
87. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO’S MAY 2013 MEDICARE BASELINE 1 (May 14, 
2013), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44205_Medic
are_0.pdf (noting though this is a small fraction of the over $500 billion 
annual Medicare expenditures). 
88. MDHMH & HILLTOP INST., supra note 17. 
89. Id. at 11. 
90. Id. at 4. 
91. Id. at 5. See also TENN. INS. EXCH. PLANNING INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 
3. 
92. MDHMH & HILLTOP INST., supra note 17, at 4-5. 
93. Id.  
94. Id.  
95. 42 U.S.C. § 18051(d)(2) (2012). 
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2. Undermining the State-Based Exchange System 
Basic Health could also undermine state-based Exchanges. Exchang-
es are arguably the centerpiece of health care reform. Through 
Exchanges the Act adopts a private market-based system as the primary 
mechanism for coverage. By regulating that system, the Act avoids the 
harshest consequences of a purely private market-based system, while 
retaining many benefits. Exchanges pool insureds to maximize individual 
buying power. They standardize benefits and place plans under a single 
roof, so consumers can compare plans without fear of selecting a plan 
with insufficient coverage. They automate eligibility and enrollment. 
Exchanges also subsidize middle class or lower enrollees to make cover-
age affordable. 
But Basic Health could threaten the long-term viability of Exchang-
es by undermining their ability to self-sustain. Through 2014, state-
based Exchanges will be administered using federal grant money. But 
after 2014, that federal funding ends. Many state Exchanges will then 
need to self-sustain. Indeed, in California, the legislature has prohibited 
using state general fund money to support Exchange operations. Thus, 
after 2014, California’s Exchange as well as many other states’ and the 
federally-operated Exchange in states that declined to create their own 
will support themselves by charging Exchange issuers user fees.  
To self-sustain, an Exchange must maintain sufficient enrollment to 
make it worth the issuers’ while. The Exchange must also maintain a 
good risk-mix to keep issuers in the Exchange market: the insured pool 
must include a sufficient number of young, healthy individuals. A 
market comprised of mostly high-risk enrollees drives away issuers. 
The Basic Health Program removes many Exchange-eligibles from 
the Exchange population — including many young and healthy people.96 
Younger individuals disproportionately earn under 200% FPL. Indeed, 
some studies find those earning under 200% are the youngest and the 
healthiest of the Exchange-eligible population.97 Without Basic Health, 
 
96. See Hwang et al., supra note 72, at 1319. 
97. Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid’s Next Fifty Years: Aligning an Old Program 
with the New Normal, 6 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 329, 334 (2013) 
(“The estimated 56 million low income adults and 35 million children who 
will experience post-reform churn across the Medicaid and Exchange 
markets represent the healthiest risk groups across the two markets. Unlike 
the millions of older and sicker adults who gain enormous benefits from 
health reform, this group is in the workforce and in relatively good health. 
The cause of their cross-market churn is, of course, income fluctuation, 
which is more likely to occur in working families than in adults who are in 
poorer health and living on fixed incomes. For these families, income 
fluctuates as younger workers enter and leave the job market, add or drop 
hours of employment, or have children, thereby increasing family size in 
relation to total household income, which in turn triggers an effective 
decline in family income in relation to the federal poverty level.”). 
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these individuals would be eligible for the highest Exchange subsidies, 
and thus are likely to enroll for Exchange coverage. But with Basic 
Health, these young and healthy individuals must enroll in Basic Health 
to receive federal subsidies, imperiling the Exchange’s risk-mix. 
Removing the under 200% population is a recipe for high premiums 
and adverse selection as the healthier are progressively pushed out by 
higher premiums. If this happens on a large scale, Exchange coverage 
could become unaffordable and ultimately replicate the dysfunctional 
individual insurance market that existed before the Affordable Care Act.  
Basic Health may also add undue administrative complexity to oper-
ating an Exchange; it is yet another program for eligibility to be 
determined. Determining Basic Health eligibility may conflict with 
existing processes in place for eligibility determinations. Many such 
processes are backed by expensive and complex IT systems that are 
already implemented. Modifying them to add new eligibility determina-
tions will add costs. And costs will multiply if this is done state-by-state 
— a likely scenario.  
Basic Health may also confuse consumers; it is a new program with 
likely different eligibility, plans, benefits, and networks. Given the 
government’s expensive investment in educating the public on how the 
Affordable Care Act works — and in particular how to enroll in an 
Exchange plan — adding yet another coverage program undermines this 
effort.  
Thus, with respect to Basic Health, several of the Affordable Care 
Act’s values are in tension. While Basic Health may address some churn 
consequences and offer affordable coverage for lower-income individuals, 
it may do so at the expense of the Act’s other goals: administrative 
simplification, consumer friendliness, preserving state autonomy and 
finances, and (perhaps most importantly) ensuring a successful Ex-
change. Enacting a program that jeopardizes Exchanges is bad policy on 
the whole, even if it provides good benefits at low cost. 
II. The Bridge Program  
A. An Overview of the Bridge Program 
The Bridge Program was first proposed in 2011 by the Tennessee 
Insurance Exchange Planning Initiative, a group formed to explore the 
State’s options in implementing the Affordable Care Act.98 Tennessee 
proposed a special category of plans for residents losing Medicaid 
eligibility.99 These plans would offer former Medicaid enrollees consistent  
98. See TENN. INS. EXCH. PLANNING INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 1; BARRY R. 
FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 835 (6th 
ed. 2008) (stating that in 1994 Tennessee launched TennCare under a § 
1115 waiver, which allows states to waive most Medicaid requirements and 
allows Tennessee to offer only Managed Care plan). 
99. TENN. INS. EXCH. PLANNING INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 1. 
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coverage as they transitioned from Medicaid to the Exchange.100 Tennes-
see also proposed having Medicaid managed care plans participate in the 
Exchange as Qualified Health Plans.101 Individuals and families leaving 
Medicaid could keep the same plan and provider network.102 From the 
enrollee’s perspective, the only practical difference would be premium 
contributions (depending on the cost of the plan).  
The federal government showed receptiveness to Bridge Programs in 
December 2012.103 The Department of Health and Human Services, 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services issued guidance allowing 
Exchanges to permit state Medicaid Managed Care issuers to offer 
Qualified Health Plans on the Exchange.104  
Several features define a Bridge plan. First, a Bridge plan is an Ex-
change plan. With few exceptions, the rules and regulations that apply 
to Exchange plans apply to Bridge plans. Premium subsidies and cost-
sharing reductions also apply. A Bridge plan is a Medicaid plan sold on 
the Exchange. Second, unlike other Medicaid plans, Bridge plans must 
be a private, commercial plan —not a public plan.  
Third, unlike a typical Exchange plan, a Bridge plan is not guaran-
teed issue for the entire market. Enrollment is limited to qualified 
individuals and families. To qualify, the individual or family must be 
leaving Medicaid.105 Children of parents transitioning from Medicaid are 
also Bridge eligible.106 Additionally, states may impose a maximum 
income for eligibility, though there is no federal requirement to do so. 
Fourth, enrollee participation in a Bridge plan is optional. Eligible 
individuals are encouraged — but not required — to select a Bridge plan 
from the Exchange.107 But the nature of Bridge plans will likely make 
them the most affordable (and best value) option for eligible individuals. 
 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. COVERED CAL., supra note 7, at 1.  
103. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON EXCHANGES, MARKET REFORMS, 
AND MEDICAID 1, 6 (2012), available at 
http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/Downloads/Exchanges-faqs-
12-10-2012.pdf. 
104. Id.  
105. COVERED CAL., supra note 7, at 6 (explaining that initial enrollment would 
be limited to individuals transitioning from Medi-Cal CHIP (formerly 
HFP) coverage). 
106. See TENN. INS. EXCH. PLANNING INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 1. 
107. COVERED CAL., supra note 7, at 7.  
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1. How the Bridge Program May Mitigate Churn Consequences  
If Medicaid Bridge plan premiums are sufficiently low, the Bridge 
Program could keep the benefits of the Basic Health Program while 
shedding many drawbacks. Individuals leaving Medicaid following 
income increases could keep their plans, with no changes in provider 
networks and no disruptions in treatment, ensuring continuity of care.108 
And the Bridge Program may prevent families from splitting into 
different eligibility groups.109 If one family member loses Medicaid 
eligibility while other family members remain eligible, all the family 
members are eligible for a Bridge plan. This ensures that families share 
the same coverage and provider network. Concomitantly, it alleviates 
consumer confusion. 
States also stand to benefit. Because Bridge plans are Exchange 
plans, the costs of administering Bridge plans are covered by federal 
grants until 2015 (states will fund costs after that). But because the 
program would be running by 2015, no additional administrative 
expenses are needed to create and implement eligibility rules for a new 
program. And no new enrollment expenses associated with creating a 
new program within an existing state entity or creating a new state 
entity to run the program would accrue to the state.  
2. Premium Share and Subsidies  
Bridge enrollees are responsible for a portion of plan premiums. But 
if procurement strategies work effectively and premiums are sufficiently 
low, individual Bridge enrollees may have little or no premium contribu-
tion.  
A Bridge enrollee’s premium contribution and subsidy is determined 
in the same manner as any Exchange plan.110 Premium subsidies turn on 
one’s income and the cost of a benchmark plan.111 Enrollees are expected 
to pay up to a certain percentage of their income for coverage. If 
coverage costs less than that percentage, they get no subsidy. If coverage 
costs more, they get a subsidy to bring the cost down to that percentage.  
Exchanges offer an array of plans. By law, all plans provide specified 
minimum benefits.112 In some states, all plans will, by law, provide 
 
108. See id. at 5, 7 (explaining that this proposal would allow individuals 
transitioning from Medi-Cal or Medi-Cal/CHIP coverage to Covered 
California to stay with the same issuer and provider network). 
109. Id. at 1, 5.  
110. See id. at 5-7. 
111. 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2012); COVERED CAL., supra note 7, at 6 (stating federal 
subsidies are based on the second lowest silver plan). 
112. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b) (2012). 
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identical benefits.113 In those states, plans differ by their premiums, 
provider network, and quality.  
In all states, plans are categorized by their actuarial value (a meas-
ure of the expected percentage of covered services the plan pays at the 
point of service): bronze (60%), silver (70%), gold (80%), platinum 
(90%).114 Actuarial value is an average, not an absolute. Some procedures 
incur higher cost-shares, others lower. And the cost-share is further 
limited by annual out-of-pocket caps; after the cap is reached, enrollees 
need not spend anything further out-of-pocket.115  
For an example of the plans that may be available to an individual, 
Anna has twelve plan options, three in each tier (there are no Bridge 
plan options in this example). Anna’s premium contribution for each 
plan is calculated based on the benchmark plan, the second least 
expensive silver level plan. For Anna, the benchmark plan is $160 a 
month.  
 
Available Exchange Plans (in monthly premiums)
 Least 
expensive 
Second least 
expensive 
Third least 
expensive 
Bronze 
(60% actuarial value) 
$100 $110 $120 
Silver 
(70% actuarial value)
$150 $160 [bench-
mark] 
$170 
Gold 
(80% actuarial value)
$200 $220 $240 
Platinum  
(90% actuarial value)
$250 $280 $300 
 
 
113. COVERED CAL., COVERED CALIFORNIA QUALIFIED HEALTH PLAN CONTRACT 
FOR 2014, at 7 (2013), available at 
http://www.healthexchange.ca.gov/BoardMeetings/Documents/May%207,
%202013/QHP%20Model%20Contract%20Clean.pdf.  
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 18022. 
115. For 2014, the annual cap was going to be $6,350 for individuals and 
$12,700 for families. Avik Roy, Yet Another White House Obamacare 
Delay: Out-Of-Pocket Caps Waived until 2015, FORBES (Aug. 13, 2013, 
12:59 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2013/08/13/yet-
another-white-house-obamacare-delay-out-of-pocket-caps-waived-until-
2015/ (noting that the caps will now take effect in 2015).  
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Anna’s contribution is based on her income. If Anna’s income is 
$17,235 (exactly 150% FPL), she must contribute 4% of her income 
towards a plan.  
 
Income Contribution for Exchange Plans116
Income as a percent of 
poverty line 
 
Initial premium 
percentage 
 
Final premium 
percentage 
 
Up to 133% 2.0% 2.0% 
133% – 150% 3.0% 4.0% 
150% – 200% 4.0% 6.3% 
200% – 250%  6.3% 8.05% 
250% – 300% 8.05% 9.5% 
300% – 400% 9.5% 9.5% 
 
Anna’s 4% contribution is measured against the $160 benchmark plan. 
The result is her premium subsidy. 
4% x $17,235 [Anna’s income] = $689.40 or $57.45 per month 
[Anna’s contribution] 
$160 [benchmark plan] - $57.45 [Anna’s contribution] = $102.55 
[the government’s contribution]  
Anna’s subsidy is $102.55. If she buys the benchmark plan, she will 
pay $57.45 a month. Anna is free to buy any plan, but the government’s 
contribution remains $102.55 a month; she will pay the difference if she 
buys a more expensive plan. But if she buys the $100 bronze plan she 
will pay nothing because it costs less than the government’s $102.55 
contribution. Similarly, if she buys a $200 gold plan, she must contribute 
$97.45.117 When she enrolls and pays her contribution the government 
will pay the insurer its portion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
116. 26 U.S.C. § 36B. 
117. Given that her income qualifies her for cost sharing reductions, a silver 
level plan will actually have lower co-pays and a lower deductible than the 
gold level plan.  
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Here are Anna’s actual costs based on her subsidy: 
 
Anna’s Contributions for Each Exchange Plan
 Least 
expensive 
Second least 
expensive 
Third least 
expensive 
Bronze 
(60% actuarial value) 
Nothing of 
$100 
$7.45 of $110 $17.45 of $120 
Silver 
(70% actuarial value)
$47.45 of 
$150 
$57.45 of $160 
[benchmark] 
$67.45 of $170 
Gold 
(80% actuarial value)
$97.45 of 
$200 
$117.45 of 
$220 
$137.45 of 
$240 
Platinum  
(90% actuarial value)
$147.45 of 
$250 
$177.45 of 
$280 
$197.45 
 of $300 
 
By comparison, Ike, who earns more than Anna, receives a smaller 
subsidy.118 Ike (who lives in the same coverage area as Anna) earns 
$22,980, exactly 200% FPL. Thus, his premium contribution is 6.3%, or 
$120.65 a month, and his subsidy is $39.35 a month: 
6.3% x $22,980 = $1,447.74 or $120.65 a month [Ike’s contribu-
tion] 
$160 [benchmark plan] - $120.65 = $39.35 [the government’s con-
tribution]  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
118. Premium percentages for mid-range income percentages are calculated on a 
sliding scale in a linear manner and are rounded to the nearest one-
hundredth of one percent. Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 50,931, 50,931 (Aug. 17, 2011) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 1). For 
example, an income of 275% is halfway between 250% and 300%, thus 
rounded to the nearest one-hundredth of one percent, the percentage is 
8.78 (halfway between 8.05 and 9.5). Id. Similarly, the rate for 210% is 
6.65%. Id.  
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Here are Ike’s plan options: 
 
Ike’s Contributions for Each Exchange Plan 
 Least 
expensive
Second least 
expensive 
Third least 
expensive 
Bronze 
(60% actuarial value) 
$60.64 of 
$100 
$70.64 of $110 $80.64 of $120 
Silver 
(70% actuarial value)
$110.64 
of $150 
$120.64 of $160 
[benchmark] 
$130.64 of $170 
Gold 
(80% actuarial value)
$160.64 
of $200 
$180.64 of $220 $200.64 of $240 
Platinum  
(90% actuarial value)
$210.64 
of $250 
$240.64 of $280 $260.64 of $300 
 
But subsidies are not an entitlement. They are only a means to en-
sure affordability. If a benchmark plan costs less than one’s expected 
contribution, there is no subsidy, even if one’s income is below 400% 
FPL.119 For example, Justin lives in the same coverage area as Anna and 
Ike and earns $34,470 a year in 2013, exactly 300% FPL. His expected 
contribution is $272.89 and he receives no subsidy: 
9.5% x $34,470 = $3,274.65 or $272.89 a month. [Justin’s contri-
bution] 
$160 – $272.89 = -$112.89 [government has no contribution]  
Because Justin’s contribution exceeds the cost of the benchmark plan, 
Justin receives no subsidy; he pays the full premium for all plans — 
regardless of the cost. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
119. See 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2012). 
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Justin’s Contributions for Each Exchange Plan  
 Least 
expensive 
Second least 
expensive 
Third least 
expensive 
Bronze 
(60% actuarial value) 
$100 of 
$100 
$110 of $110 $120 of $120 
Silver 
(70% actuarial value)
$150 of 
$150 
$160 of $160 
[benchmark] 
$170 of $170 
Gold 
(80% actuarial value)
$200 of 
$200 
$220 of $220 $240 of $240 
Platinum  
(90% actuarial value)
$250 of 
$250 
$280 of $280 $300 of $300 
 
 
This is not a loophole to the government’s obligation to subsidize 
those who earn up to 400% FPL. Justin still gets the deal he would have 
gotten (insurance at 9.5% of income), but he does so without the 
complicated tax consequences, such as reconciliation, which may occur 
for individuals receiving premium subsidies. Reconciliation is the IRS’s 
end-of-year calculation to determine whether the advance subsidy 
payments to an individual accord with an individual’s tax-year income.120 
If the advance payments were too high (because the individual earned 
more than expected) the IRS will assess the difference.121 But overpay-
ment assessments are capped based on income.122 If payments were too 
low, the IRS refunds the difference.123  
Premium subsidies work the same for Bridge plans. But Bridge plans 
are expected to cost less than most, if not all, plans available on the 
Exchange and thus will require little, if any, enrollee contribution. Small 
premiums are important if the transition from Medicaid to Exchange 
coverage is to be relatively seamless.  
 
120. 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B–4 (2013); Hwang et al., supra note 72, at 1315. 
121. 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B–4. 
122. 26 U.S.C. § 36B. 
123. Id. 
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3. Cost Sharing 
In addition to premium contributions (if any), Bridge enrollees incur 
a limited amount of cost-sharing.124 Examples include a $10 doctor visit 
co-pay, $200 for a hospital admittance, or a 20% coinsurance for a 
specific procedure.  
But cost-sharing for Bridge enrollees is limited. Cost-sharing subsi-
dies offset most cost-sharing.125 For example, an individual earning 138% 
FPL enrolling in a silver-level plan126 (70% actuarial level) would receive 
a government subsidy boosting the actuarial value to 94%.127 The insurer 
recoups the difference in cost sharing from the federal government.128 For 
providers, this affords a far more reliable source of payment.129  
 
Income Silver actuarial value plus subsidy 
100–150% FPL 94% 
151–200% FPL 87% 
201–250% FPL 73% 
 
B. Practical Issues with the Bridge Plan 
1. Setting the Proper Price for a Bridge Plan 
The Bridge Program has several practical hurdles, most relating to 
ensuring a proper price for Bridge plans. Too low or too high a price can 
create consequences for enrollees. 
Offering a Bridge plan can affect an enrollee’s premium tax credit. In 
some cases, an individual may be worse off if a Bridge plan is available 
to him.130 This is because a premium subsidy turns on the silver plan’s 
availability to the individual at the time of enrollment. As a silver-level 
Exchange plan, the Bridge plan can affect which plan is the second-
lowest-cost silver plan.  
 
124. See COVERED CAL., supra note 7, at 6. 
125. See 42 U.S.C. § 18071 (2012). 
126. Cost subsidies are available only for silver-level plans. 
127. See TENN. INS. EXCH. PLANNING INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 3; COVERED 
CAL., supra note 7, at 6-7 (stating the actuarial value of a silver plan is 
70% with cost sharing subsidies bringing it up to 94%). 
128. See TENN. INS. EXCH. PLANNING INITIATIVE supra note 13, at 3. 
129. Id. 
130. See id. at 2. 
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Unless the Bridge plan’s premium is at least as much below the oth-
erwise-lowest-cost silver plan as the premium for the otherwise-lowest-
cost silver plan is below the otherwise-second-lowest cost silver plan, the 
individual could end up worse off with a Bridge plan offered than 
without.  
For example, Kelsey has an income of $24,000 and her premium con-
tribution share is 4% of her income. Under Scenario #1 with no Bridge 
plan available to Kelsey, Kelsey’s subsidy is $170 per month. If Kelsey 
bought the lowest cost silver plan, she would pay $50 a month. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
$24,000 x 4% = $960 or $80 per month. [Kelsey’s contribution] 
$250 – $80 = $170 subsidy [the government’s contribution]  
Under Scenario #2, a Bridge plan is available to Kelsey, and it is 
less expensive than any other silver plan. It therefore bumps the previ-
ously lowest-cost plan into the benchmark position. With a less-
expensive benchmark plan, Kelsey’s subsidy for all plans (including the 
Bridge plan) shrinks. 
 
Scenario #2 Monthly Costs                            
(with Bridge Plan Option) 
Bridge plan Second lowest cost 
silver plan (formerly 
lowest cost silver)  
Third lowest cost 
plan (formerly second 
lowest cost silver) 
$200 $220 (benchmark) $250 
 
With a benchmark plan available, Kelsey’s subsidy drops to $140 from 
$170:  
$24,000 x 4% = $960 or $80 per month [Kelsey’s contribution] 
$220 – $80 = $140 subsidy [the government’s contribution]  
Scenario #1 Monthly Costs                
(with No Bridge Plan) 
Lowest cost silver plan Second lowest cost 
silver plan 
$220 $250 (benchmark) 
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With a subsidy of $140, $30 less than before, if Kelsey buys the Bridge 
plan (even though it is $20 cheaper than the lowest-cost plan in Scenario 
#1), Kelsey’s monthly out-of-pocket is now $60 instead of $50. The 
lower cost Bridge plan costs Kelsey money! 
To avoid this, a Bridge plan should be significantly cheaper than the 
previously lowest cost plan. This compensates for the lower premium 
subsidy brought about by the cheaper benchmark plan. For example, in 
Scenario #3 the Bridge plan is now $40 cheaper, and this will save 
Kelsey money. 
 
Scenario #3 Monthly Costs                            
(with Lower Priced Bridge Plan Option) 
Bridge plan Second lowest cost 
silver plan (formerly 
lowest cost silver)  
Third lowest cost 
plan (formerly second 
lowest cost silver) 
$160 $220 (benchmark) $250 
 
$24,000 x 4% = $960 or $80 per month. [Kelsey’s share] 
$220 – $80 = $140 subsidy [the government’s contribution] 
Now Kelsey’s subsidy is still only $140 (versus $170 without the 
Bridge plan), but because the Bridge plan costs only $160, Kelsey pays 
only $20 a month for the Bridge plan. Thus to keep Bridge enrollees 
from paying more for premiums, the Bridge programs must be a good 
deal less expensive than the alternatives.  
A related problem occurs if the Bridge program costs significantly 
more than other Exchange plans. A Bridge plan that is too expensive, 
though it will not affect the benchmark or subsidy, gives eligible individ-
uals no incentive to enroll. For example, a Bridge plan costing $280 gives 
Kelsey no incentive to enroll: 
 
Scenario with an Expensive Bridge Plan
Lowest-cost plan Second lowest cost 
silver plan 
Bridge plan 
$220 $250 (benchmark) $280 
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$24,000 x 4% = $960 or $80 per month. [Kelsey’s contribution] 
$250 – $80 = $170 subsidy [the government’s contribution] 
Kelsey receives the full $170 subsidy, but if she applies it to the $280 
Bridge plan, she will pay $110 per month. Given that she could buy the 
cheapest plan for only $50 per month, the financial incentives work 
against her selecting the Bridge plan. Indeed, she may end up changing 
provider networks to avoid paying for the expensive Bridge plan, 
undermining the whole point of the Bridge program. Thus, Bridge plans 
must be competitively priced.  
This discussion of overly expensive Bridge plans is not purely hypo-
thetical. In California, for example, not all Medicaid managed care plans 
participating in the Exchange came in at the lower end of the premium 
spectrum for plan year 2014.131 Thus, consumer protections should ensure 
that the availability of a Bridge plan does not adversely affect consumers 
and their premium subsidies. This could be achieved by requiring 
Exchanges to exclude plans not in the consumer interest or to empower 
them to use selective contracting authority for the same purpose.132 
2. The Difficulty in Matching Medicaid Coverage 
A Bridge plan must be available both as a Medicaid and an Ex-
change option. If a Medicaid plan is not available on the Exchange, 
there is no “bridge” for the consumer –the consumer must change plans 
and possibly providers.  
This could happen if Medicaid insurers opt not to offer plans on the 
Exchange. Indeed, the primary hurdle for a successful Bridge Program is 
convincing Medicaid insurers to offer plans on the Exchange. This 
requires them to become certified as Qualified Health Plans and, in 
many cases, to obtain a license to sell health insurance in the commercial 
market.133  
Still, if a Medicaid enrollee is covered by a plan not available on the 
Exchange, it may be good policy to make available alternative Bridge 
plans. By offering a plan that is similar but not identical to the Medicaid 
plan, the enrollee can maintain a substantially similar provider network. 
Thus, losing eligibility would not mean changing care providers. Moreo-
ver, in states that implement strict benefit requirements for Medicaid 
and Exchange plans, the switch would not entail changing benefits.  
 
131. See COVERED CAL., HEALTH INSURANCE COMPANIES AND PLAN RATES FOR 
2014: MAKING THE INDIVIDUAL MARKET IN CALIFORNIA AFFORDABLE 6-7 
(Aug. 6, 2013), 
https://www.coveredca.com/PDFs/English/plans/CC_Health_Plans_Boo
klet-8-6-13.pdf (providing Covered California’s statewide average premium 
rates). 
132. Id. 
133. See S.B. 3, 1st Extraordinary Sess. (Cal. 2013). 
Health Matrix·Volume 24·2014  
Crossing 138: Two Approaches to Churn under the ACA 
137 
And once enrollees switch into an Exchange Bridge plan, they could 
keep that same plan, even if they churn back into Medicaid because 
every Bridge plan on the Exchange will be available in Medicaid (even if 
the inverse is not true).134  
C. Legal Issues with the Bridge Plan 
The Bridge Program raises several legal issues. Like the Basic Health 
Program, different values underlying the Affordable Care Act are in 
tension with Bridge Program implementation. And several important 
consumer protection reforms in the Act (crucial in the context of private 
commercial coverage) pose legal obstacles to a successful Bridge pro-
gram. 
Beginning in 2014, non-grandfathered individual or small group 
health plans may not reject applicants for any reason except application 
fraud. This is known as the guaranteed issue requirement.135 And such 
plans must permit existing enrollees to renew their coverage at the end 
of each plan year, known as the guaranteed renewability requirement.136  
These reforms are backed by good and powerful reasons. In the indi-
vidual market, issuers used to deny enrollment to those with preexisting 
conditions or a history of medical claims. Issuers would also terminate 
coverage for individuals with higher-than-expected claims during a plan 
year.137 These practices were common in states without a guaranteed 
issue or renewability requirement — leaving those most needing care 
either unable to get it or unable to get it at affordable prices. But the 
guaranteed issue and guaranteed renewability requirements pose obsta-
cles to the Bridge Program.  
1. Guaranteed Issue Requirement 
If the purpose of the Bridge program is to bridge Medicaid and Ex-
change coverage, it does not follow that all Exchange-eligible individuals 
should have access to Bridge plans.138 Indeed, Bridge plan networks will 
 
134. An enrollee who fell below 138% could always switch to Medicaid if he or 
she is dissatisfied with the Bridge plan for any reason. 
135. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (2012). 
136. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-2(a) (2012). 
137. See Memorandum from the Comm. on Energy and Commerce Staff to the 
Members and Staff of the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations 7 
(June 16, 2009), available at 
http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/Press_ 
111/20090616/rescission_supplemental.pdf; Terminations of Individual 
Health Policies by Insurance Companies, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight and Investigations, 111th Cong. 2 (2009) (statement of Rep. Bart 
Stupak, Chairman). 
138. See Letter from State of Tenn., to Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 
Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. app. C (Oct. 31, 2010), available at 
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likely have limited capacity. Allowing anyone to enroll could overwhelm 
these plans, forcing plans to close enrollment and excluding the very 
group the Bridge Program is designed to benefit.  
Thus, the federal government has allowed states to limit eligibility 
by contract with the state Medicaid agency — rather than by statute or 
regulation — without running afoul of the guaranteed issue requirement. 
A state Medicaid agency can include in its contracts with Bridge plan 
issuers a provision that individuals transferring out of Medicaid are 
eligible for the Bridge Program, but the issuer need not allow other 
Exchange enrollees to enroll.  
Under the government’s rationale, this contractual method does not 
violate the guaranteed issue requirement because it is imposed contrac-
tually through the Medicaid program. Therefore, it is merely an 
extension of Medicaid. This legal maneuver lets the Bridge Program 
sidestep the guaranteed issue requirement.139 
In the same vein, the Bridge Program’s goals are served by limiting 
eligibility to a specified maximum income. While it would be generous to 
allow Medicaid enrolled lottery winners to keep the same plans and 
provider network, the Bridge Program’s aims are not advanced by 
enrolling that population. Rather, given the limited capacity of Bridge 
plans and the affordability goal, only individuals transitioning out of 
Medicaid into the lower end of the Exchange subsidy should be assured 
access to the program.  
2. Guaranteed Renewability Requirement 
Guaranteed renewability also poses a potential problem. The Bridge 
Program is conceptually a transitional program. An individual’s remain-
ing on a Bridge plan indefinitely regardless of how long he has been 
Exchange-eligible or how much he earns undercuts the program’s 
purpose, which is to ensure an easy transition into commercial Ex-
change-based coverage. But limiting the duration of eligibility runs afoul 
of the guaranteed renewability requirement.  
As with the guaranteed issue requirement, states can address the 
renewability requirement by contracting with managed care providers 
through Medicaid to limit the duration of Bridge plan enrollment and 
set income caps. California followed this approach in enacting Califor-
nia’s Bridge Program legislation.140 
3. Qualified Health Plan Requirements under the Exchanges  
The Bridge Program also conflicts with plan offering requirements. 
The Affordable Care Act and implementing regulations require each 
 
http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006480f62063
&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf. 
139. Id. 
140. See S.B. 3, 1st Extraordinary Sess. (Cal. 2013). 
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Qualified Health Plan issuer to offer at least one plan at the silver level 
(70% actuarial value) and one at the gold level (80% actuarial value). 
California law requires Qualified Health Plan issuers to offer at least one 
plan at all five levels.141 And, with certain exceptions, each Exchange 
issuer that also participates in the private commercial market outside of 
the Exchange must offer each Qualified Health Plan both inside and 
outside of the Exchange.142  
Those requirements make sense for non-bridge Exchange plans. But 
Bridge plans are designed for low-income individuals with limited ability 
to cost share. For this population, only silver-level plans make sense 
because only silver plans are eligible for cost-sharing subsidies. Gold and 
platinum plans are a bad deal for low-income individuals because the 
cost-sharing subsidies for silver plans raise the actuarial value of silver 
above that of higher-priced gold and platinum plans.143  
For the same reason, a bronze level plan may not be suitable as a 
Bridge plan for many enrollees because bronze plans are not eligible for 
cost-sharing subsidies. Low-income individuals may have a hard time 
shouldering the high co-pays and deductibles (40% actuarial value) of 
bronze plans.144 And the cost-sharing subsidies are needed to make the 
Bridge plans functionally similar to Medicaid. Thus, silver level plans 
make the most sense for Bridge plans. 
Moreover, most potential Bridge plan issuers have no interest in ex-
panding their commercial coverage plans beyond those necessary to 
effectuate best value Bridge coverage. And although most Medicaid 
managed care issuers do not participate in the private commercial 
market, some do, such as issuers covering county workers in their 
relevant service area and Medicaid-managed care beneficiaries. In 
California, some Medicaid-managed care issuers are newly entering the 
individual and small group market in order to participate in the Ex-
change. Thus, it would be onerous for them to have to offer their Bridge 
products to the outside market as well.145 
Ultimately satisfying Exchange Qualified Health Plan requirements 
is only partially possible under existing law. State requirements may be 
 
141. Id. (noting the other three are bronze, platinum, and catastrophic plans). 
142. COVERED CAL., supra note 7, at 8. 
143. Eligible individuals must have an income below 250% of the federal 
poverty level. 
144. Young, healthy people are likely to opt for the bronze or catastrophic plans 
when they can. Their monthly premiums are lower, and unless they get 
unexpectedly sick or injured they are likely to have lower usage than 
average. 
145. This would be necessary only to comply with the California rule that an 
issuer that participates in the outside commercial market (not Medicaid or 
CHIP) must offer all Qualified Health Plans both inside and outside the 
Exchange. 
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sidestepped.146 Because a state statutory change was necessary to 
implement the Bridge Program in California, it was simple enough to 
exempt Bridge plan issuers from the required offerings mandate. But the 
federal requirement to offer at least a silver and gold plan is not 
waivable at the state level. Thus, Bridge plan issuers must offer eligible 
enrollees both a silver and a gold plan. This will create unnecessary work 
for the issuer who must create and obtain certification for the superflu-
ous gold plan. And issuers and Exchange administrators must work to 
discourage people from enrolling in gold Bridge plans as they are not a 
good deal for Bridge-eligible individuals below 250% FPL. 
Conclusion 
Fundamentally, Basic Health creates an alternative to the Exchange 
while the Bridge Program works through the Exchange. This difference 
ultimately makes the Bridge Program’s approach superior. Basic 
Health’s primary deficiency is that its very existence threatens the 
Exchange. State-based Exchanges will stand or fall based on participa-
tion; a critical number of enrollees and a proper risk-mix ratio are 
essential. Basic Health threatens both of these by segmenting the 
market. It channels a group of largely young and healthy individuals 
away from the Exchange, leaving Exchange plan issuers fewer and less 
healthy customers. By contrast, the Bridge Program works within the 
Exchange framework and keeps all eligible populations in the Exchange. 
This encourages a healthy risk-mix ensuring a sustainable Exchange. 
Basic Health also leaves too many questions about the cost to the 
state. Though the federal government will provide funding, it is unclear 
how administrative expenses will be covered and whether the govern-
ment’s contribution will completely cover the cost. If funds are 
insufficient, the Affordable Care Act leaves states few options in terms of 
reducing benefits or shifting costs to enrollees. Still, while Basic Health 
may be costly to the states, the Bridge Program has the potential to be 
more costly to enrollees because the Bridge Program has fewer re-
strictions that ensure that enrollee premium contributions are at a 
minimum.  
Ultimately, the Bridge Program can better mitigate the effects of 
churn for several reasons. The Bridge Program can extend beyond 200% 
FPL. For instance in California, an enrollee remains eligible for Bridge 
plans until he exceeds 250% FPL. And because the federal government 
has not regulated at this point, theoretically states could have no 
maximum income for Bridge eligibility. At 250% FPL ($58,875 for a 
family of four) individuals can better weather shifts and are less likely to 
see dramatic income shifts. And if they do cross 250% FPL, the shift will 
 
146. See S.B. 3, 1st Extraordinary Sess. (Cal. 2013) (exempting Bridge plans 
from the requirement to sell plans at all five coverage levels). 
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be less dramatic than switching from one program – Medicaid – to 
another – Exchange coverage. The switch is between one Exchange plan 
to a different, but likely comparable, Exchange plan.  
 For these reasons, the Bridge Program is the superior approach. And 
given the risk the Basic Health Program poses to the Exchanges, 
arguably, Basic Health could undermine health care reform more than 
churn might.  
 
